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Abstract: The time-limited dispatch (TLD) of aircraft allows operators efficiently to meet
certification requirements. In order to show that these requirements are met it is necessary
to model the aircraft systems to which TLD is being applied. Currently, variations of fault tree
analysis and Markov analysis are commonly used. However, in order to apply either of these
methods, a number of assumptions are made to assist in the analysis. Monte Carlo
simulation (MCS) is presented here as an alternative method of demonstrating the required
level of system reliability. A simple system is analysed using a time-weighted average
approach, a reduced fault state Markov approach, and an MCS approach. MCS is seen to
offer benefits when modelling the application of TLD to a simple system that could also be
seen in the modelling of the application of TLD to real aircraft systems.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Time-limited dispatch (TLD) was first utilized after
the introduction of full authority digital electronic
control (FADEC) systems to commercial aircraft
some 20 years ago. These electronic engine control
systems regulate engine thrust from the beginning
of fuel metering up to the time of fuel shut-off.
When FADEC systems were introduced, it was to be
the first time that a hydromechanical control
(HMC) system would be unavailable to pilots in the
event of an electronic system failure [1].
FADEC systems are designed around a dual chan-
nel control system, and, as such, incorporate a
degree of redundancy. Each engine has a FADEC sys-
tem in which all critical loops and functions have
either dual systems or redundant elements.
Although it was expected that this would lead to
greater control system integrity, the dispatch criteria
imposed when FADECs were introduced actually led
to an increase in delays and cancellations of flights
[2], [3]. This was due to the fact that, in the absence
of any dispatch guidelines for FADEC systems, a
conservative approach was taken in which dispatch
was forbidden with faults in more than one channel
of an engine. However, because of the high reliability
of the FADEC systems in comparison to the HMC
systems, an opportunity arose to utilize the redun-
dancy present to allow dispatch with faults present
in the FADECs. Required airworthiness standards
would still be met and aircraft operators would ben-
efit from the reduction in delays and cancellations of
flights. The new approach, which allowed dispatch
with reduced levels of redundancy, was called time-
limited dispatch (TLD).
TLD allows the dispatch of aircraft with faults pre-
sent while ensuring a level of system reliability. This
level was set according to the levels that were
required of the HMC systems that were used prior
to the introduction of FADECs. A maximum limit of
10 events per 106 flight hours (flt h) is set for the
average loss of thrust control (LOTC) rate of the sys-
tem [2]. In achieving this average, a further restric-
tion of an upper limit of 100 events per 106 flt h is
applied for the instantaneous LOTC rate of dispatch-
able system configurations.
When implementing TLD an aircraft may be dis-
patched over differing periods of time according to
the significance of the faults present in the system
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[2]. These dispatch intervals, which give the maxi-
mum time allowed for dispatch before the faults
must be addressed, fall into four categories:
(a) do not dispatch (DND);
(b) short time dispatch (STD);
(c) long time dispatch (LTD);
(d) manufacturer/operator defined dispatch
(MDD).
The DND category, when applied, means the faults
present in the system prohibit dispatch of the air-
craft and the faults must be addressed immediately.
The STD category allows operation of the aircraft in
the short term before corrective maintenance must
be undertaken and the LTD category allows dispatch
in the longer term. The final category, MDD, is
reserved for faults that do not affect the LOTC rate
of the system [2]. The LOTC rate for faults in the
LTD category must not exceed 75 events per 106 flt
h. STD category faults have an LOTC rate that lies
between 75 and 100 events per 106 flt h and for
DND category faults the instantaneous LOTC rate
exceeds 100 events per 106 flt h.
1.1 Maintenance strategies
Two maintenance strategies exist that may be used
to maintain a system on which TLD is being imple-
mented. There is no restriction to which strategy
must be used when maintaining a system. In fact, if
desired, one of the strategies may be used to main-
tain STD category faults while the other is used to
maintain LTD category faults. The two maintenance
approaches are described below.
1.1.1 MEL maintenance
Minimum equipment list (MEL) maintenance [2] is
generally applied to STD faults. When MEL mainte-
nance is used, the exact time of occurrence of the
fault must be known, at which time a ‘countdown’
is started of the appropriate dispatch interval.
When the countdown ends, the fault must be
repaired in order to allow further dispatch of the air-
craft. This process is illustrated in Fig. 1, where a
fault occurring at time t1 initiates a dispatch interval
ending at t2. If the fault is not repaired at or before
t2, further dispatch of the aircraft is prohibited at
that time.
1.1.2 PIR maintenance
The second method of maintenance is periodic
inspection/repair (PIR) maintenance, normally
used with LTD category faults. This involves check-
ing the system for faults at regular intervals. In this
case the exact time of occurrence of the fault
will not be known. If a fault is discovered at an
inspection, it is assumed to have occurred at the
midpoint of consecutive inspections [2]. The dis-
patch interval is then deemed to have begun at the
midpoint of the inspections and the allowed period
of dispatch from the inspection where the fault was
discovered is calculated. A PIR maintenance sce-
nario is illustrated in Fig. 2, in which I1 and I2 repre-
sent consecutive inspections of the system for faults.
A fault, which occurred at time tf is discovered at I2
and, because the exact time of the fault is not known,
is assumed to occur at t1, the midpoint of the inspec-
tion interval. The countdown of the dispatch interval
is then assumed to have begun at this time and it will
end at t2. This allows dispatch of the aircraft for a
further time T after I2. The inspection interval for a
fault category must not exceed twice the dispatch
interval for faults of that category. In that way the
average exposure to faults cannot exceed the appro-
priate dispatch interval. However, note that the max-
imum possible exposure of the system to a fault
could be twice the dispatch interval. Contrast this
with the MEL maintenance approach where the
maximum possible exposure of the system to a fault
is equal to the dispatch interval.
PIR could be used to address the maintenance
requirements of more than one category of faults.
In systems where this is the case, inspections for
faults of a certain category may uncover faults that
fall into another dispatch category. If this occurs,
the fault may be dealt with as if discovered at the
next inspection for its own category [2]. For example,
the presence of an STD fault at an LTD inspection
would be noted but the STD fault would be treated
as if found at the next inspection for STD faults.
1.2 The simultaneous presence of multiple
faults in the system
In spite of the high reliability of FADEC system com-
ponents, there exists the opportunity for more than
 dispatch interval 
t t1 t2 
Fig. 1 MEL maintenance
dispatch interval 
t t1 t2 I2 I1 
T 
tf 
Fig. 2 PIR maintenance
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one fault to be present in the system at any one time.
If this happens, there are a number of different
issues that could arise and impact upon the mainte-
nance of the FADEC system. Examples of such sce-
narios are outlined below for the MEL maintenance
strategy. These examples are by no means exhaus-
tive, but merely hint at the complexities involved in
modelling the TLD process. Indeed, when one
begins to consider PIR maintenance or a combina-
tion of MEL and PIR and, although such situations
would be rare, the presence of more than two faults,
the maintenance options available become more
complex.
Consider Fig. 3, which depicts the occurrence of
two faults, A and B, repaired using MEL mainte-
nance. The dispatch intervals for these faults will
end at t1 and t2 respectively. As t1 is reached, a num-
ber of options are possible. Clearly, fault A must be
cleared from the system at this time in order to allow
further dispatch. In addition to this either:
(a) B may be allowed to remain in the system,
allowing dispatch until t2; or
(b) Bmay also be cleared from the system, allowing
unlimited dispatch after t1.
Figure 4 depicts a similar scenario to that shown in
Fig. 3. Faults A and B, when occurring in isolation,
cause the initiation of LTD intervals, ending at t1
and t2 respectively. However, as soon as both A and
B are present within the system, the allowable period
of dispatch is reduced to the STD category. This
means that, as fault B occurs, the system may then
be dispatched only until time t3, not t2 as would be
the case if fault A had not occurred. Upon reaching
t3, there are three possible maintenance strategies.
1. Both faults, A and B, may be cleared from the
system, allowing unlimited dispatch of the
system.
2. Fault B alone may be cleared from the system,
allowing dispatch until t1, at which point fault A
must be addressed.
3. Fault A alone may be cleared from the system,
allowing dispatch until t2, at which point fault B
must be addressed.
Of course, this scenario assumes that t3 occurs
before t1. If fault B occurred at such a time that t3
occurred after t1, then fault A would have to be
cleared from the system at t1 before the STD mainte-
nance deadline was reached at t3.
When faults combine in the way just described to
reduce the dispatch interval, the order of occurrence
of the faults may have an effect on whether or not
the dispatch interval is reduced. For instance, in
the example shown in Fig. 4, if fault B follows fault
A, an STD interval is initiated. If the ordering of
these faults was unimportant, the same reduction
in dispatch interval would be seen if fault A followed
fault B. However, if the ordering of these faults was
important, it may be that A following B would not
lead to the same reduction in dispatch interval as
when B followed A.
The scenarios described above merely hint at the
complexities of TLD and the repair processes
involved in the maintenance of a FADEC system.
When analysing the use of TLD in the maintenance
of a FADEC system, the ability of the model used to
deal with these complexities may be of importance
if accurate results are to be obtained.
2 MODELLING TLD
Before applying TLD to a FADEC system, it is impor-
tant to be sure that the system will still meet the
levels of safety required of it. To do this a mathe-
matical model of the system is constructed and an
analysis is performed to monitor the effects of TLD
on the system and obtain the average LOTC rate of
the system. Two methods of analysis that are widely
used are described in references [1] and [3]. These
approaches are based on fault tree analysis (FTA)
and Markov analysis and are described briefly below.
Also described is a third technique, Monte Carlo sim-
ulation (MCS), proposed by the authors as a suitable
alternative method of conducting a TLD analysis.
2.1 Time-weighted average (TWA) approach
This TLD modelling approach obtains a value for the
LOTC rate of the system by adding the following
three quantities:
(a) the sum of the failure rates of faults in the
mechanical/hydromechanical portion of the
FADEC system;
t A t1 B t2 
Fig. 3 Multiple faults (MEL maintenance)
tA t1B t2t3
STD
LTD
LTD
Fig. 4 The combination of multiple faults (MEL
maintenance)
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(b) the sum of the failure rates of the system owing
to unrevealed electrical/electronic faults;
(c) a time-weighted average (TWA) of the failure
rates of the system from each of its dispatchable
configurations.
This last quantity is obtained by multiplying the frac-
tion of time spent in each dispatchable system con-
figuration by the failure rate to LOTC from that
particular configuration. Consider a FADEC system
with n dispatchable configurations and let the first
of these (configuration 1) represent the full-up sys-
tem state; the configurations numbered from 2 to
m represent the configurations allowing STD and
the configurations from m þ 1 to n represent the
configurations allowing LTD. Let li represent the
failure rate into the ith dispatchable configuration.
Define Ti, the dispatch interval for the ith dispatch-
able system configuration as follows
Ti ¼
TSTD, if i ¼ 2, . . . ,m
TLTD, if i ¼ mþ 1, . . . ,n
(
ð1Þ
where TSTD is the short time dispatch interval and
TLTD is the long time dispatch interval. Thus an
expression for the TWA LOTC rate of the system is
lTWA ¼ lHMC þ lUR þ
Xn
i¼1
tili;L ð2Þ
where lHMC represents the sum of failure rates due
to mechanical/hydromechanical faults and lUR
represents the sum of failure rates due to
unrevealed electrical/electronic faults. The fraction
of time spent dispatching from dispatchable
configuration i is ti and li,L represents the system
failure rate to LOTC from the ith dispatchable
configuration. Equation (2) is a general form of the
equations given in references [1], [3], and [4].
Because ti represents the fraction of time spent
dispatching from system state i, it is required that
the total of all n of these fractions is unity. Thus,
the following expression for t1, the fraction of time
spent dispatching from the full-up state, is obtained
t1 ¼ 1
Xn
i¼2
ti ð3Þ
An approximation for ti with i ¼ 2,. . .,n, i.e. the
fraction of time spent dispatching from the faulty
dispatchable configurations, is
ti ¼ liTi ð4Þ
This is equivalent to the approximation given in the
original version of SAE ARP5107 [3].
The system failure rate to LOTC from the ith dis-
patchable system configuration, li,L, is calculated in
reference [1] by dividing the failure probability to
LOTC by the average flight time. This ‘probability
per flight hour’ is equated to the desired failure
rate. Thus
li;L ¼ Qi;L
tflt
ð5Þ
where Qi,L is the failure probability of LOTC from the
ith dispatchable configuration.
Thus, by substituting (3), (4), and (5) into (2), an
expression for the TWA LOTC rate of the system
may be obtained.
In a revision to the original SAE ARP5107 docu-
ment, a revised method of calculating the time
fractions ti, i ¼ 2,. . .,n is given [4]. This method is
claimed to balance better the fractions of time spent
in each dispatchable system configuration because,
rather than assuming the system is in the full-up
state for all the time, it is assumed to be in the full-
up state for t1. The new values for ti are
ti ¼ t1 liTið Þ ð6Þ
In this case (3) and (6) give a system of n linear
simultaneous equations that can be solved for ti,
i ¼ 1,. . .,n. Then, together with (5) these may be
substituted to give an expression for the TWA LOTC
rate of the system.
2.2 Reduced-state Markov model approach
The reduced fault state Markov approach is similar
to a conventional Markov modelling approach. How-
ever, there are two notable differences.
1. The number of system states is greatly reduced.
2. An artificial simulated repair transition is added
to the model.
The reduced-state Markov approaches described in
references [1], [3], and [4] are similar in that the
number of system states is reduced by considering
usually only single fault states, i.e. states where
only one fault exists in the system in addition to
the full-up state and the LOTC state. Dual and
higher-order fault states may be added to the model
if considered of particular importance or if the
FADEC system architecture requires it. A reduced-
state Markov model for a general system is shown
in Fig. 5. This particular model is similar to that
given in SAE ARP5107 revision 1 [4]. As a single
mechanical/hydromechanical fault could cause
LOTC from any fault state, a transition is added
from the full-up (state 1) and all single fault states
(states 2,. . .,n) to the LOTC state. The other addition
to the model, over a conventional model, is the feed-
back loop, a simulated repair from the LOTC state to
the full-up state. This is added to the model in order
to allow a steady state solution to be calculated.
Considering the Markov model shown in Fig. 5, the
transition rate matrix, A, is given by
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All terms that are off-diagonal and are not elements
of the first or last columns are zero. The term lH
represents the sum of lHMC and lUR. This leads to a
system of n þ 1 differential equations
_Q tð Þ ¼ Q tð ÞA ð8Þ
where
Q tð Þ ¼ Q1 tð Þ;Q2 tð Þ; . . . ;Qnþ1 tð Þ½  ð9Þ
and Qi(t) is the probability of the system being in
state i at time t. At steady state the rate of change
of each of these probabilities is zero, therefore
equation (8) becomes
QA ¼ 0 ð10Þ
which is a system of n þ 1 linear simultaneous
equations. These equations are dependent and, in
order to obtain an independent system, one of the
equations is arbitrarily chosen to be replaced by the
constraint equation
Xnþ1
i¼1
Qi ¼ 1 ð11Þ
In order to find the LOTC rate of the system, the
average failure rate into the LOTC state, n þ 1, is
used. The definition of the reduced-state Markov
(RSM) LOTC rate is hence
lRSM ¼ Probability flow into state nþ 1
1 Probability of being in state nþ 1 ð12Þ
which is
lRSM ¼
lHQ1 þ
Pn
i¼2
li;L þ lH
 
Qi
1Qnþ1 ð13Þ
Equations 2 to n of the set of simultaneous equations
obtained above (from columns 2 to n of matrix A)
yield the following expressions for Qi
Qi ¼ li
ni þ liL þ lHQ1, i ¼ 2, . . . ,n ð14Þ
which may be substituted into (13), along with a
rearrangement of (11), to give
lRSM ¼
lH þ
Pn
i¼2 ðlili;LHÞ=ðni þ li;LHÞ
 
1þPni¼2 li=ðni þ li;LHÞ  ð15Þ
where li,LH is the sum of li,L and lH. This is the
general form of the solution for the RSM model as
given in reference [4]. If the repair intervals are as
defined in equation (1), then the repair intervals are
given as the reciprocals of the dispatch intervals, i.e.
ni ¼ 1
Ti
ð16Þ
Equations (15) and (16) may now be used to obtain
the LOTC rate using different values of STD and
LTD intervals.
2.3 Monte Carlo simulation
The first step in performing an MCS is to create a
computer code that will model the behaviour of the
system over time. The code contains a structured,
logical set of rules that will describe how the system
reacts to every event that may occur during its use
[5]. When modelling TLD, such events could be
component repairs, failures, sequences of failures,
or TLDmaintenance deadlines and the like. The gen-
eration of a uniform set of random numbers is key to
the success of any MCS. In a TLD simulation these
random numbers are used to generate component
failure times using the relevant failure or repair dis-
tributions for each component. The simulations are
run until such a time that the system fails or the
λ2,L
state 1
(Full-up)
state n + 1
(LOTC)
state 2
state n
λn
λn,L
λ
ν
2
νn
2
νFB
λH
λH
λH
Fig. 5 A single fault state Markov model
A ¼
 lH þ
Pn
i¼2
li
 
l2    ln lH
n2  n2 þ l2;L þ lH
 
0 0 l2;L þ lH
..
.
0 . .
.
0 ..
.
nn 0 0  nn þ ln;L þ lH
 
ln;L þ lH
nFB 0    0 nFB
2
66666664
3
77777775
ð7Þ
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maximum lifetime of the system is reached. After
each simulation the relevant parameters are stored
and, once these parameters lie within the required
tolerance, the series of simulations is ended.
When TLD is modelled using MCS, the scheduling
of events that affect the system is of the utmost
importance. Component failure times are initially
added to the schedule. The simulation time is
advanced to the time of the first event chronologi-
cally in the schedule. As a component fails, the status
of the system is checked and if the system fails, the
simulation ends. If the system does not fail upon
the failure of a component, then a list of TLD criteria
is checked to see if a TLD maintenance deadline or
periodic inspection should be added to the schedule
because of the component failure. The deadline or
inspection could be added because of that failure
alone, or because of that failure acting in combina-
tion with other component failures. The schedule
and the correct ordering of events is perhaps the
most important part of the simulation of TLD. The
structure utilized in the MCS code used here stores
the positions of events previous to and after each
event and these must be updated as, for example,
the first event chronologically is removed from the
schedule, or deadlines are removed from the sche-
dule after faults are repaired.
One of the major advantages of implementing an
MCS is the large degree of flexibility or complexity
that may be involved in the code. For instance,
when a maintenance deadline is reached, the differ-
ent repair strategies that are possible may be carried
out easily. It would be possible, for example, to clear
all faults from the system at each deadline, to clear
all faults falling into the same dispatch category, or
simply to address the fault that caused the deadline.
Other strategies are possible and part of the beauty
of MCS lies with the fact that different maintenance
strategies could be tested before being applied to a
real system. MCS is also able to model different stra-
tegies better than the usual TWA or Markov-based
approaches. Different flight lengths to represent
short-haul and long-haul operations can be speci-
fied, as can different system operational lifetimes.
The algorithm for the main module of the MCS
code used in this work is shown in Fig. 6. Owing to
the fact that any maintenance operations (TLD
deadlines and inspections) cannot occur mid-flight,
the time of such operations are adjusted to occur
between flights. This is done by moving the opera-
tion forward to the beginning of the flight in which
it would otherwise fall.
The code written and used to model TLD here is
flexible in that it can use data from any fault tree of
a system failure mode. In addition to the fault tree,
the failure distributions of the components and the
TLD dispatch criteria to be applied to the system
are passed to the code before simulations begin.
The failure rate of the system is calculated after every
1000 simulations and the solution is obtained to the
required number of significant figures. This is done
by checking that the value of the failure rate is
unchanged for a number of consecutive calculations.
3 EXAMPLE SYSTEM
The system modelled in this work is a simple one,
containing only four components. The system archi-
tecture is shown in Fig. 7. As can be seen from the
diagram, it essentially consists of two channels, 1
and 2, each of which contains a power supply and
a CPU. However, in order to add further redundancy
to the system, a link between the two channels is
provided that allows, for example, the channel 1
power supply to provide power to the channel 2
CPU if its own power supply fails. The failure rates
of the individual components are given in Table 1,
along with the dispatch category that will be applied
if one of them fails. These dispatch categories were
determined for each component by considering the
instantaneous failure rate (to LOTC) with that com-
ponent failed, using the approximation given in
equation (5). The same approximation was used to
estimate the instantaneous failure rate (to LOTC) of
each of the dual fault states, i.e. the system config-
urations where two faults are present in the system.
These failure rates suggested that all dual faults
would fall into the DND category and thus need
not be included in the SAE TWA and Markov ana-
lyses. However, these dual faults are included in the
MCS as DND faults. Higher-order fault states than
this need not be considered for this system as, once
three components are failed, the system is definitely
failed.
When modelling the system using the TWA and
RSM approaches, the failure rate due to mechani-
cal/hydromechanical faults, lHMC, and the failure
rate due to unrevealed faults, lUR, were not consid-
ered in the SAE analyses.
TWA results were obtained for both methods of
calculating the time fractions; see equations (4) and
(6), given in the original [3] and revised [4] versions
of SAE ARP5107. As mentioned previously, the
Markov results were obtained for a single fault state
model, as higher-order faults would fall into the
DND category and need not be included in the ana-
lysis. This is also the case for the TWA model but
these DND category faults are included in the MCS
model. Results were obtained for the MCS for a
number of different maintenance strategies and
approaches. STD and LTD faults were addressed
using all possible combinations of the MEL and PIR
maintenance approaches. Thus, both STD and LTD
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faults were dealt with using MEL maintenance in
one set of simulations, one with MEL and the other
with PIR in the next set, and, finally, both would be
maintained using PIR maintenance. When PIR
maintenance was used to maintain faults, the
inspection interval was varied as a function of the
dispatch interval and defined as 1.0, 1.5, and, finally,
2.0 times the dispatch interval. At the maintenance
deadlines, the faults could be repaired in a number
of different ways in order to allow further dispatch
after the deadline. For this system the repairs were
carried out in three different ways, each of which
represented carrying out a varying amount of work
on the system.
1. Repair the last fault of the group of faults that
initiated the maintenance deadline.
2. Repair all of the group of faults that initiated the
maintenance deadline.
3. Clear all faults present in the system at main-
tenance deadlines.
END
N
START
Input system logic, 
component failure 
distributions and TLD data.
Y
Initialise. Add 1st
component failures to 
schedule. Start simulation.
Simulation time advanced
to time of 1st / next event
in schedule.
Is the
system lifetime 
exceeded?
Is the
event a maintenance
deadline?
Is the
event a component
failure?
Does
the system now
fail?
Perform necessary repairs, 
add new component failure 
times to the schedule.
Add a maintenance 
deadline to the schedule, if 
not added previously.
Add the maintenance 
deadline or periodic 
inspection to the schedule.
Has the
overall LOTC rate
converged?
Is a maint.
deadline or inspection 
initiated?
N
Y N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
N
Y
The event is a periodic 
inspection at which a
fault/s is/are discovered.
Fig. 6 The algorithm for the main module of the MCS code
Channel 1 
Power 
Channel 2 
Power 
CPU 1
CPU 2 
Channel 2 
Channel 1 
Fig. 7 The simple FADEC system representation
Table 1 Component failure rates and dispatch categories
Component Failure rate (f/h) Dispatch category
Power 1 9.0 · 105 STD
CPU 1 5.2 · 105 LTD
Power 2 8.0 · 105 STD
CPU 2 6.5 · 105 LTD
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The first of these maintenance approaches repre-
sents perhaps the minimum amount of work that
could be carried out at a maintenance deadline in
order to allow further dispatch. An example of apply-
ing this approach would be as follows. If CPU1 failed,
an LTD interval would be initiated. If Power1 was to
fail in the subsequent period before the maintenance
deadline, a DND maintenance deadline would be
added to the end of the current flight. In this mainte-
nance approach, Power1 would be repaired, leaving
the CPU fault present in the system until the LTD
maintenance deadline occurs. The second approach
would be a slightly more rigorous approach to
repairs than the first because, for instance, in the
example given above, as the DND maintenance
deadline was encountered, all faults that caused it,
i.e. Power1 and CPU1, would be repaired. The final
maintenance approach listed above is most likely
to be the one that will produce the lowest LOTC
rate, as when any maintenance deadline occurs, all
faults that are present in the system are repaired
and the system is thus returned to a full-up state.
For the MCS the maximum lifetime of the system
was assumed to be 200 000 flt h. This corresponds
to a period of use of approximately 37 years for a sys-
tem used for 15 h/day. The length of a flight (used in
the TWA approach and the MCS) was set to be
5h. This was assumed in a worked example in
reference [1].
4 RESULTS
Results were obtained for an STD interval length of
between 50 and 200 flt h in 50 flt h steps with the
length of the LTD interval varying between 200 and
2 000 flt h in 200 h increments. Below are some of
the results obtained for the 200 flt h STD interval.
Figure 8 shows a comparison of the results from
the SAE approaches and MCS with STD faults
addressed using the MEL maintenance approach,
and LTD faults addressed using the PIR maintenance
approach, which appears to be the most commonly-
used maintenance combination in practice. The PIR
inspection intervals are set at 1.5 times the dispatch
intervals and at maintenance deadlines, all faults
are cleared from the system (the third of the
approaches listed earlier). It can be seen from this
graph that the TWA method with the original time
fraction coefficients produces the highest calculated
LOTC rate and that the TWAmethod with the revised
time fraction coefficients produces a calculated
LOTC rate that is consistently lower than this over
the range of LTD intervals. The single state Markov
is again lower but the lowest calculated LOTC rate
comes from the MCS. Assuming that the MCS mod-
els the system more accurately than the other mod-
els, which is a reasonable assumption, this means
that the TWA and single fault state Markov methods
of analysis are suitable models for this system
because the LOTC rate is overestimated.
Figure 9 shows a comparison of results for the
three different maintenance approaches described
earlier. Again, STD faults are addressed using MEL
maintenance and LTD faults are addressed using
PIR maintenance with the inspection interval set at
1.5 times the dispatch interval. This graph shows
that there is a significant difference in the predicted
LOTC rate for the three maintenance approaches.
While repairing the last fault of the group that
(STD-MEL, LTD-PIR) inspection interval = 1.5x dispatch interval.
STD interval = 200 hrs.
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Fig. 8 A comparison of the SAE ARP5107 approaches with MCS
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caused the deadline, the predicted LOTC rate is
greater than the LOTC rate when repairing all faults
that initiated the deadline or clearing all faults pre-
sent in the system at the maintenance deadlines.
The final two maintenance approaches give very
similar results, the LOTC rate obtained when all
faults are cleared from the system at maintenance
deadlines being slightly lower. One would expect
that this particular difference could be even more
pronounced if a larger system were being modelled.
With this in mind consider Fig. 10, which shows a
comparison of the MCS results for the best and worst
of the maintenance approaches with the results from
the TWA method (with balanced time coefficients)
and the single fault state Markov method. It can be
seen here that the single fault state Markov approach
actually gives an LOTC rate that is lower than that
predicted when the system is repaired by repairing
only the last fault of the group causing a main-
tenance deadline. The TWA method still overesti-
mates the LOTC rate, even for this maintenance
approach. As observed earlier, both SAE methods
overestimate the LOTC rate when all faults are
cleared from the system at maintenance deadlines.
In order better to quantify these differences, con-
sider Figs 11 and 12, which show the percentage dif-
ferences of the LOTC rate obtained using the TWA
and single fault state Markov methods from the pre-
dicted LOTC rate from the MCS. Figure 11 clearly
shows that when maintenance involves clearing all
faults from the system, the TWA method (with the
original time coefficients) overestimates the LOTC
rate in comparison to the MCS by between 11.7 per
cent and 50.4 per cent over the LTD interval range
of 200 to 2000 flt h. Over the same range the TWA
method with the balanced time coefficients overesti-
mates the LOTC rate by between 5.7 per cent and
18.8 per cent and the single fault state Markov model
overestimates the LOTC rate by between 1.75 per
cent and 9.68 per cent. Figure 12 shows that the
TWAmethod with original time coefficients overesti-
mates the LOTC rate in comparison to the MCS by
between 7.2 per cent and 27.6 per cent over the
LTD interval range between 200 and 2000 flt h. The
TWA method with balanced time coefficients over-
estimates very slightly, the percentage overestimate
actually falling from 1.5 per cent to 0.8 per cent.
However, the single fault state Markov approach
underestimates the LOTC rate in relation to the
MCS by 2.3 per cent at a value of 200 flt h for the
LTD interval. This percentage rises to 6.9 per cent
at a value of 2000 flt h for the LTD interval.
The question now is, what effect these differing
modelling approaches would have on the dispatch
of the system considered as an example here. Con-
sidering again Fig. 8, it can be seen that, given the
upper limit for the average LOTC rate of ten failures
per 106 flt h that, given a STD interval of 200 h, the
LTD interval could be set at about 1050h if the
TWA method (with the original time coefficients)
was used to model the system. Using the same
method, but with the balanced coefficients, would
allow the LTD interval to be set at about 1300h, a
vast improvement. However, the single fault state
Markov model would allow the LTD interval to be
set at about 1450 h and the MCS would allow a dis-
patch interval for LTD faults of around 1650 h if all
faults were to be cleared from the system at the
(STD-MEL, LTD-PIR) inspection interval = 1.5x dispatch interval.
STD interval = 200 hrs.
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same time. However, from Fig. 9 it can be seen that,
if the maintenance approach involves repairing the
last fault of the group that initiated the deadline,
the maximum allowed LTD dispatch interval would
be around 1400 h.
Only a small sample of the MCS results obtained
are given because all the results showed
similar trends to those presented above and the sce-
narios involved here were considered to be a good
representation of a general approach to TLD. The
shorter the STD interval, the smaller was the LOTC
rate for particular LTD interval values, as would be
expected. As would also be expected, increasing the
length of the inspection interval when PIR mainte-
nance was used led to an increase in the LOTC rate
of the system. This increase in the LOTC rate was
most pronounced when PIR was used to address
LTD category faults, regardless of the maintenance
approach used for STD faults. This may be due to
the difference in length of the dispatch intervals
STD-MEL, LTD-MEL, clear all faults in the system at deadlines.
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themselves and therefore the relative lengths of the
inspection intervals. For instance, for the maximum
modelled LTD interval of 2000 h, the inspection
interval (and hence potential exposure time of this
failed system state to further faults) would be
4000h. Contrast this with the situation for the maxi-
mum modelled STD interval of 200 h, where the
inspection interval would only be 400 h.
5 CONCLUSIONS
A number of conclusions may be drawn from the
modelling of the use of TLD on this simple system.
The first, and perhaps most important, is that MCS
allows the flexibility to model a large number of
potential maintenance scenarios and observe the
effect of these on the LOTC rate of the system. In
short, a more exact modelling of the system lifetime
is obtained. One could expect MCS to provide a
more accurate measure of the LOTC rate than that
obtained using the SAE approaches in general, for a
number of reasons. First, the construction of the
TWA and RSM models involve considering only a
limited number of dispatchable system states, non-
dispatchable states not being included in the mod-
els. This could result in a model that does not
describe the system in a completely accurate man-
ner. Contrast this with MCS, where a complete sys-
tem fault tree is used and no eventualities need be
discounted when calculating system LOTC rates.
Failure rates must be calculated for use in each of
the SAE models, both into and out of the dispatch-
able system states. An issue here is that these failure
rates could be difficult to calculate, particularly if
one considers the fact that there may be dependen-
cies between various aircraft subsystems. Another
point to take into account when one considers fail-
ure rates is that those of individual components
may vary with time. A property such as this can be
incorporated easily into an MCS approach, whereas
it could prove difficult to include in other
approaches.
For this system the different maintenance
approaches were demonstrated to have such an
effect on the LOTC rate that the single fault state
Markov approach, for one such maintenance
approach, was seen to underestimate the LOTC rate
of the system in comparison to the MCS. It should
be noted that the maintenance approach in question
(repairing the last fault of the group of faults that
caused the deadline) may not necessarily be a realis-
tic approach and that it may be possible to modify
the single fault state Markov approach in order bet-
ter to model such a repair strategy. However, this
may bring an element of doubt as to whether the
SAE modelling approaches would always guarantee
a LOTC rate of 10 or less failures per 106h for any
system. Of course, the application of TLD to a more
complex, realistic system may result in more accu-
rate results or, at least, a guaranteed overestimate
STD-PIR, LTD-PIR, repair last fault of the group that initiated the deadline.
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of the LOTC rate of the system. This requires further
investigation.
Clearly, the use of MCS could prove to be a useful
tool in the modelling of TLD. Indeed, if one looks
from the certification viewpoint, MCS could allow
the demonstration of compliance of the LOTC rate,
while being able to maximize/optimize the dispatch
intervals in order to establish the most advantageous
maintenance strategy. MCS could also offer the most
accurate measure for the LOTC rate of the system
and be used to obtain other information about the
system, such as the instantaneous LOTC rates from
various system states.
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APPENDIX
Notation
0 null vector
A transition rate matrix
DND do not dispatch
FADEC full authority digital electronic control
LOTC loss of thrust control rate
LTD long time dispatch
MCS Monte Carlo simulation
MEL minimum equipment list
PIR periodic inspection and repair
Q(t) vector of state probabilities at time t
Qi(t) probability of state i at time t
Qi,L failure probability of LOTC from ith dis-
patchable system configuration
STD short time dispatch
tflt flight time (hours)
ti fraction of time dispatching from dispatch-
able system configuration i
Ti dispatch interval for the ith dispatchable
system configuration (hours)
TLTD long time dispatch interval (hours)
TSTD short time dispatch interval (hours)
lH sum of lHMC and lUR
lHMC sum of failure rates due to mechanical/
hydromechanical faults
li failure rate into the ith dispatchable system
configuration
li,L system failure rate to LOTC from the ith dis-
patchable system configuration
li, LH sum of lH and li,L
lRSM reduced-state Markov model LOTC rate
lTWA time-weighted average model LOTC rate
lUR sum of failure rates due to unrevealed elec-
trical/electronic faults
nFB feedback repair rate
ni repair rate from the ith dispatchable system
configuration
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